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The democratic fallacy in matters of clinical




Arriving at a consensus between multiple clinical opinions concerning a particular case is a complex issue - and
may give rise to manifestations of the democratic fallacy, whereby a majority opinion is misconstrued to represent
some kind of “truth” and minority opinions are somehow “wrong”. Procedures for handling multiple clinical
opinions in epidemiological research are not well established, and care is needed to avoid logical errors. How to
handle physicians’ opinions on cause of death is one important domain of concern in this respect. Whether
multiple opinions are a legal requirement, for example ahead of cremating a body, or used for supposedly greater
rigour, for example in verbal autopsy interpretation, it is important to have a clear understanding of what
unanimity or disagreement in findings might imply, and of how to aggregate case data accordingly.
In many settings where multiple physicians have interpreted verbal autopsy material, an over-riding goal of arriving
at a single cause of death per case has been applied. In many instances this desire to constrain findings to a single
cause per case has led to methodologically awkward devices such as “TB/AIDS” as a single cause. This has also
usually meant that no sense of disagreements or uncertainties at the case level is taken forward into aggregated
data analyses, and in many cases an “indeterminate” cause may be recorded which actually reflects a lack of
agreement rather than a lack of data on possible cause(s).
In preparing verbal autopsy material for epidemiological analyses and public health interpretations, the possibility
of multiple causes of death per case, and some sense of any disagreement or uncertainty encountered in
interpretation at the case level, need to be captured and incorporated into overall findings, if evidence is not to be
lost along the way. Similar considerations may apply in other epidemiological domains.
Introduction
The concept of “a second opinion” is common in many
professional spheres, including clinical practice. This
may be a matter of seeking confirmation of an initial
viewpoint, or looking for refutation of a doubted opi-
nion. The interpretation of multiple opinions may not,
however, be logically consistent, in that two coinciding
opinions are often taken to represent “truth”, while
ignoring the possibility that both may be incorrect. Con-
versely, a minority opinion may actually represent
“truth”, even if not readily perceived as such. This is the
basis of the democratic fallacy, which is manifested
when a majority opinion is inferred to constitute some
kind of truth. Stated in more general terms, if a panel of
ten people are asked to express a preference between
products A and B, and more than 5 express their prefer-
ence for A, then the correct inference is that the major-
ity of people prefer product A; but an incorrect
inference would be that A is an inherently better pro-
duct than B, and such an interpretation would be an
example of the democratic fallacy.
In matters of clinical judgement, it is not uncommon
to seek a second opinion (a process which might be
instigated either by clinician or patient). However, in
routine clinical practice, it is often unclear (at least in
any formalised sense) as to how a conflict between dif-
ferent clinical opinions can or should be resolved [1,2].
In addition, some individual opinions may (often justifi-
ably) be considered to be more authoritative or reliable,
perhaps because of factors such as seniority or
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specialised experience. Hence, even where there are only
two opinions, they may not count equally, and one may
effectively “out-vote” the other, irrespective of “truth” in
a particular case. This kind of pseudo-democracy can
therefore lead to various manifestations of the demo-
cratic fallacy. When larger numbers of opinions are
potentially available, such as in a ward round or case
conference context, the potential for confusion between
majority opinions and correct conclusions becomes
greater [3].
This potentially dangerous combination of pseudo-
democracy and clinical opinion sometimes intrudes into
epidemiological research. Although quantitative health
research is usually designed to be as objective and con-
sistent as possible at all stages of the research process, it
is often necessary to include the collection of clinical
opinion at the individual case level as part of data gath-
ering. A careful methodological approach for this key
stage of the process is critically important, but not
always carefully considered. If every case is assessed by
the same clinician, the methodological issues are fairly
simple, but the entire research comes to depend criti-
cally on the skill and consistency of that one observer. If
each case is assessed by just one of several clinicians,
then the democratic fallacy is not an issue, but there
may be serious problems of inter- and intra-observer
variation. However, what often happens (possibly in
response to justifiable concerns about the consistency of
single assessments) is that each case is assessed by mul-
tiple clinicians. Sometimes these may be quality-assured
by insisting on independent, blind assessments; but then
in cases where there are discordant opinions, rather
vague processes of negotiating a common consensus or
bringing in additional opinions (which may also be con-
sidered to carry more individual weight) to arrive at a
final conclusion are often followed. The democratic fal-
lacy can easily intrude into these processes.
These principles could apply to a range of epidemiolo-
gical settings, such as clinical trials with entry or end-
point criteria defined in terms of clinical opinion, and
even more generally to scientific peer-review. One speci-
fic domain in which the above issues are currently
clouding research is in analysing cause-of-death data. In
settings where physician certification of cause-of-death
is commonplace or required, the opinion of a single
physician is often taken to be sufficient, though in var-
ious jurisdictions there may be requirements for second
opinions, for example before a body can be cremated
[4]. Procedures regarding second opinions are often
modified on the basis of notorious cases, for example
that of Harold Shipman in England [5], and such med-
ico-legal developments may have implications for
the epidemiological analysis of cause-of-death data
over time. However, of more concern in terms of
non-standardised analytical approaches to cause-of-
death data is the issue of how clinical opinion is used in
the context of verbal autopsy (VA) techniques, as used
in settings where deaths are not routinely physician-
certified [6].
This article explores practices that have grown up
around physician interpretation of VA data and argues
for more consistent and logical approaches.
Analysis
Common practices in interpreting VA data
After someone dies in a setting where routine death cer-
tification is not carried out, a VA interview with family,
friends or carers of the deceased can yield valuable
information about the circumstances of death. There
has been a lot of work put in to formulating and
standardising VA interview instruments [7]. Much less
consideration, however, has been given to standardising
the interpretation of VA interview material into cause-
of-death data. Although computer models can give
highly standardised interpretations [8], many researchers
still prefer the more subtle and nuanced approach that
physician interpreters can bring to the process. But then
the unresolved issues are how many physicians should
interpret each case and how should conflicting opinions
be resolved? A general principle seems to have grown
up that using more than one physician interpreter per
case is desirable, presumably to bring greater rigour to
the process, although the justifications for doing so are
usually not made explicit. Recently published examples
of cause-specific mortality research relying on physician
interpretation of VA material reveal a wide variation of
approaches [9]. Joshi et al. have argued for using a single
physician per case, but more on operational than
scientific grounds [10], although they were working in a
project that initially used two initial blinded assessors,
who were over-ruled by a third assessor when they dis-
agreed. Kahn et al. described initially using two blinded
assessors, bringing in a third on disagreements, then a
discussion among all three if two agreed; a cause of
death was only recorded if overall consensus could be
achieved [11]. Often the precise methods used to arrive
at what sometimes appears to be the “holy grail” of a
single, unambiguous cause for each case are not clearly
defined [12].
Many of these approaches seem to have grown up out
of unstated assumptions that VA approaches should try
to mimic physician certification and coding, even if
unable to do so with great accuracy. International stan-
dard procedures for death certification are set out
within the ICD-10 system [13] but that system goes into
levels of detail and diagnostic sophistication that are
often not realistically achievable with VA data. ICD-10
expects the possibility of multiple causes of death per
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case, categorised according to complex schemas into a
single underlying cause (which is envisaged as the cause
to be used for epidemiological tabulations) and antece-
dent cause(s). There is no place in ICD-10 for carrying
forward doubt as to particular individual causes on the
part of certifying physicians into aggregated analyses of
coded causes, being specifically prohibited: “Qualifying
expressions indicating some doubt as to the accuracy of
the diagnosis ... should be ignored” [13]. Similarly, it is
not possible to have “cause A or cause B” as an underly-
ing cause. WHO, in trying to establish international
standards for VA [14] based on ICD-10, still makes the
assumption that the outcome should be one ICD-10
underlying cause per VA case. Although in principle
antecedent causes might also be derived from VA mate-
rial, these principles seem to be boiled down in practice
in many VA applications to training physician coders to
arrive at a single cause of death per case. Consequen-
tially, if more than one physician coder is used per case,
potentially complex issues arise in terms of how to han-
dle agreements and disagreements at the individual case
level. Universally in the VA literature, multiple opinions
that agree on the same cause of death for a particular
case are interpreted as representing the “true” cause,
irrespective of the possibility of the democratic fallacy
manifesting in some cases, while procedures for hand-
ling discordant opinions vary as discussed above.
Epidemiological analyses of cause-of-death data
A major objective of arriving at case-level cause(s) of
death is to move on to epidemiological analyses of mor-
tality patterns. Epidemiology specialises in the science of
uncertainty, and so the clinically-perceived imperative,
reflected in the ICD-10 “underlying cause” concept, for
an unambiguous single cause of death per case is no
longer entirely relevant. What is more important is to
arrive at the most likely possible cause(s) and to under-
stand something about the certainty with which these
are relevant to particular cases, feeding all of this into
aggregated results. Thus, if two physician assessors sug-
gest different outcomes, it is probably more relevant in
epidemiological terms to record both as possible causes,
allocating a weighting of 50% to each, rather than trying
to squeeze the different opinions into a single cause of
death. This approach also eliminates the possible effect
of the democratic fallacy, since there is no longer any
requirement for consensus. Even if three assessors per
case are used, with two agreeing and one dissenting, the
same methodology can be applied with a 67%:33%
weighting.
In some studies of VA material, cases not achieving
consensus between assessors, for example instances
where two initial assessors disagreed and a third asses-
sor came up with a third cause of death, have been
automatically designated as “undefined” or “indetermi-
nate”. This generally puts them into the same analytic
category as cases where VA interviews were not carried
out successfully or there were no witnesses to the cir-
cumstances of death [11]. This seems a very difficult
methodology to defend scientifically, since several care-
fully considered case reviews, albeit with different con-
clusions, are surely not equivalent to missing data, and
can easily be handled epidemiologically with partial
weights assigned to different opinions. Even if one asses-
sor rates a case as “indeterminate” and one or two
others assign a particular cause, such a case can be
handled as partly indeterminate and partly attributed to
particular causes.
When VA material is interpreted by probabilistic com-
puter models, the likelihood of putative cause(s) can be
made more explicit and it is also possible to characterise
quantitatively the overall lack of certainty for a case [8].
These kinds of output can be handled in a similar way
as outlined above, with the additional possibility of char-
acterising part of a case as “indeterminate” - with a
weighting of (100% - sum of likelihoods for probable
causes). This approach also facilitates comparisons
between physician assessment and computerised prob-
abilistic interpretation of VA material, as recently car-
ried out in South Africa [15].
Public health interpretation of VA data
In its turn, making epidemiological sense of cause-of-
death data is an essential step towards public health
understandings of populations. In settings where VA is
most practised, which usually lack routine certification,
cause-specific mortality findings often represent a key
component among relatively scanty overall public health
information. Against this background, it is important to
consider what the possible adverse effects of different
approaches to handling physician opinions on VA data
might be.
There are two major issues here. Firstly, the often
limited amount of information contained in VA inter-
views is more likely to leave physician coders in some
doubt as to the underlying cause of death, compared
with certification in more sophisticated settings, and in
turn this is more likely to lead independent coders to
different conclusions on the same case. In terms of
public health, however, it is clearly unhelpful to com-
pletely lose the thinking around such cases by conse-
quently declaring them indeterminate. It is much more
important to capture the uncertainties and range of
opinions, handle these data epidemiologically, and so
enable them to be included in public health thinking.
This is an important difference of principle from ICD-
10’s exclusion of capturing uncertainty at the indivi-
dual underlying cause code level (even though
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physicians may admit to being uncertain at the certifi-
cation stage [16,17]).
Secondly, if physician coders are essentially forced into
reaching a single cause of death per case, problems arise
in public health interpretations around certain com-
monly-linked causes of death. The most obvious is the
well-documented interaction between tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS. Many single-cause regimes get around the
difficulty of this particular example by designating one
single cause as “TB/AIDS” but this is methodologically
unsatisfactory and can conceal potentially interesting
detail [15]. However, within any such set of commonly-
linked causes that are handled individually, if a lack of
case-level agreement between physicians is considered
“indeterminate”, then those particular causes involved
may be under-represented in aggregate. A common
example of this would be diarrhoea or malnutrition as
causes of childhood death, where one physician’s “diar-
rhoea” and another’s “malnutrition” could result in
neither cause contributing to public health conclusions.
There is undoubtedly further work to be done in evalu-
ating different approaches to VA interpretation, includ-
ing WHO’s approach based on ICD-10, but also
considering what the most practical and meaningful
approaches for policymakers may be.
Conclusion
Avoiding any confusion between majority opinions and
scientific truth is a critical issue in handling clinical
opinion data. Although these methodological explora-
tions do not necessarily address or solve all the pro-
blems of incorporating clinical opinions on cause of
death into epidemiological data and public health con-
clusions, they highlight some of the potential pitfalls.
Because physician certification of deaths and physician
interpretation of verbal autopsy data are not entirely
equivalent procedures, it cannot be assumed that ways
of handling differences of opinion, case-level uncer-
tainty and multiple causes should be similar. The pos-
sibility of multiple causes per case emerging from VA
assessments should be encouraged rather than hidden,
even if associated with some degree of uncertainty. In
particular, a lack of agreement between physician opi-
nions on a particular case should not be regarded as
a reason to effectively exclude such cases as being of
“indeterminate” cause. In broader terms, there may
well be other areas of epidemiological research invol-
ving multiple clinical opinions where similar considera-
tions are relevant.
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